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Abstract
We study implementation of a social choice correspondence in the case of two players
who have von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities over a finite set of social alternatives,
and the mechanism is allowed to output lotteries. Our main positive result shows
that a close variant of the popular approval voting mechanism succeeds in selecting
only Pareto efficient alternatives as pure Nash equilibria outcomes. Moreover, we
provide an exact characterization of pure Nash equilibria profiles and outcomes of
the mechanism. The characterization demonstrates a close connection between the
approval voting mechanism and the notion of average fixed point, which is a point that
is equal to the average of all points that it does not Pareto dominate.
1 Introduction
Pareto efficiency is a key requirement in mechanism design and implementation theory. The
question of whether mechanisms exist that implement Pareto efficient outcomes, has been
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studied extensively in the literature. The classical works of Maskin [16] and others [7, 19, 2]
characterise Nash implementable social choice correspondences (SCCs) and construct robust
mechanisms, so-called canonical mechanisms, that accomplish implementation of every Nash
implementable SCC (in particular, Pareto efficient ones). These canonical mechanisms,
however, are complex, and not likely to be used in a practical setting. This paper focuses on
the question whether Pareto efficiency can be implemented by (non-dictatorial) simple and
realistic mechanisms. We address this question in a quite general setting: two players who
have von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities over a finite set of social alternatives1. Building
upon the approval voting mechanism that is simple and widely used in practice (see [5, 34]),
we introduce a mechanism that implements Pareto efficient outcomes only.
We consider a standard setting that the number of alternatives is finite, and the mech-
anism’s outcomes are lotteries over the alternatives2. We are looking for a mechanism that
satisfies the following properties:
(a) A pure Nash equilibrium3 always exists.
(b) All pure Nash equilibria outcomes are (approximately) Pareto efficient.
(c) The mechanism is anonymous: namely, it is symmetric in the players (this requirement
reflects “fairness” of the mechanism).
In the approval voting mechanism each player either approves or disapproves each of the
alternatives. The alternative that achieves the maximum number of approvals is chosen. In
case of a tie the choice is uniform at random among the maximizers4. The approval voting
mechanism has been used for decades by many professional societies5 [5] and more recently by
the commercial coordination program Doodle, see [34]. It is known that the approval voting
mechanism admits Pareto efficient pure Nash equilibrium, but it also might admit inefficient
1The results can be generalized to the case of ordinal preferences, see Section 4.3.
2This exact setting is addressed in virtual implementation, see [2].
3Alternatively we may focus on the subset of strict Nash equilibria. All the results in the paper hold for
strict equilibria, under mild genericity assumptions, see Section 4.1.1.
4The case of non-uniform choice among the maximizers is addressed in Section 3.
5For instance, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the Mathematical Association
of America (MAA), and the American Statistical Association (ASA), to mention a few.
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equilibria, see [5] and Example 1. We consider the following modification of the approval
voting mechanism: If any alternatives are approved by both players, then with probability(1−δ) the mechanism chooses uniformly at random among the alternatives that achieve two
approvals (as in the original mechanism); while with probability δ the mechanism chooses
uniformly at random among the alternatives that are approved by at least one player. A
motivation for such a modification of the mechanism appears in Remark 1. Note that the
mechanism requires only a binary message regarding each alternative—this is simpler than
the direct revelation principle, which requires the exact utility at each alternative. Our main
positive result (see Section 2.2) provides an exact characterization of pure Nash equilibria
outcomes and profiles of the modified approval voting mechanism. This characterization
implies that the modified approval voting mechanism satisfies the above properties (1)-(3).
Interestingly, the outcomes of the mechanism are closely related to the notion of an average
fixed point (see Section 2.1) which is a point that is equal to the average of all points that
it does not Pareto dominate. Roughly speaking, the set of outcomes is the set of Pareto
efficient alternatives that Pareto dominate an average fixed point, or an average fixed point
itself if it is Pareto efficient.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 further discusses the related literature on
approval voting and implementation theory. The main results are in Section 2, where we
also discuss the application of the results to bargaining (Section 2.3). Section 3 generalizes
the results for a wider class of mechanisms, and Section 4 concludes with a discussion.
1.1 Related Literature
1.1.1 Approval Voting
Approval voting has been studied in the voting context [5, 4, 21], generally in the case where
the number of voters is large and the number of alternatives is small. It has been observed
that approval voting admits a Pareto efficient Nash equilibrium [5], but also that it might
admit Pareto inefficient equilibria [5]. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
in which a reasonable modification of the approval voting succeeds in selecting only Pareto
efficient outcomes as pure Nash equilibria outcomes. We do this for two-player interactions;
3
in Section 4.2 we show it to be impossible for three or more players.
Most closely related to ours is a recent paper by Nu´n˜ez and Laslier [22], which demon-
strates efficiency of the approval voting mechanism in two-player interactions by showing
the following result: Under the behavioural assumption of partial honesty6 the two-player
game that is induced by the approval voting mechanism admits a pure Nash equilibrium
and all its pure Nash equilibria are Pareto efficient. Our results differ from [22] because we
do not impose any behavioural assumption on the players, namely players preferences are
determined solely by their utilities. Moreover, our lower bounds on the utilities of the players
in the modified approval voting mechanism improve upon the lower bounds of the standard
approval voting mechanism. In [22] it is proven that every player gets at least the average
outcome. We prove that every player gets at least his utility in the worst average fixed
point. Every average fixed point Pareto dominates the average outcome, so this is a stronger
bound. Finally, in the context of partial honesty and sincereness, the main theorem in [22]
shows that for the standard approval voting mechanism there exists a pure Nash equilibrium
where both players use sincere actions. It is interesting to note that in our modified approval
voting mechanism this statement is no longer true, see Example 3 in Section 4.1.2.
1.1.2 Implementation Theory
Implementation of Pareto efficient social choice correspondences (SCCs) is a central topic in
implementation theory. The impossibility result by Hurwicz and Schmeidler [12] states that
only dictatorial SCCs can be Nash implemented if we require that a pure Nash equilibrium
always exists, and that all pure Nash equilibria outcomes are Pareto efficient. This impossi-
bility result can be avoided by either posing (mild) domain restrictions on the preferences of
the players (see e.g., [7]) or by virtual implementation, which requires only an approximate
implementation of the social choice correspondence (see e.g., [2]). In this paper we stick to
the virtual implementation approach: we have no restrictions on the preferences, but the
mechanism implements outcomes that are ε-close to Pareto efficiency rather than exactly
6The partial honesty assumption is that if a player is indifferent between two actions a and b where a
is a sincere action (namely it contains all alternatives above some threshold) and b is not sincere, then the
player strictly prefers a over b.
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Pareto efficient.
More generally, Nash Implementation in complete information settings has been stud-
ied extensively in various aspects. One aspect, originated by Maskin [16], characterizes
the class of SCCs that can be Nash implemented, see [16, 7, 19, 2]. The canonical mech-
anisms that implement any implementable SCC have been criticized for their complexity
which makes their usage somewhat unrealistic. Simplifications of the canonical mechanism
have been studied in [25, 17, 28], but yet the canonical mechanism remains quite involved.
This led to another branch of implementation theory which aims to implement concrete
SCCs using simple and practically realizable mechanisms. Such mechanisms (beyond the
dictatorial ones) that achieve Pareto efficiency in all equilibria, are known only in concrete
cases such as exchange economies settings [11, 8, 30, 26], and more specifically for Walrasian
allocations [23, 6] and Lindahl allocations [31, 32]. This paper belongs to this branch of
implementation theory, and addresses the setting of a finite number of alternatives with
lottery outcomes. This exact setting has been studied in the context of general SCCs in
the works [2, 7], which however use canonical mechanisms; they show that such mechanisms
may implement Pareto efficient outcomes only. The contribution of the present paper is
in the simplification of the implementation mechanism. We show that a modified approval
voting mechanism virtually implements a Pareto efficient SCC. Moreover, in Section 3 we
introduce a class of weighted approval voting mechanisms which implements a richer class of
Pareto efficient SCCs (see Corollary 2). Our class of SCCs is similar to the class of SCCs
that was introduced by Dutta and Sen in [7]. The class of SCCs in [7] was proven to be im-
plementable by the (relatively involved) canonical mechanism. Our class of SCCs is proven
to be implementable by the (relatively simple) weighted approval voting mechanism.
2 Approval Voting Mechanism
The finite set of alternatives is [n] = {1,2, ..., n}. Player’s i = 1,2 von Neumann - Morgenstern
utility of the alternative k = 1,2, ..., n is denoted by aki . We normalize the utilities such that
0 ≤ aki ≤ 1. The utility profile of alternative k is denoted by ak ∶= (ak1, ak2). The collection of
utility profiles is denoted by A ∶= {ak ∶ 1 ≤ k ≤ n} which is a collection of n points in [0,1]2.
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In the approval voting mechanism (AV) each player i = 1,2 submits a set of approved
alternatives Li ⊂ [n]. If the sets are disjoint (i.e., L1 ∩ L2 = ∅) then we say that players
disagree, and the outcome lottery is a uniform distribution over L1 ∪ L2 (or over [n] if
L1 ∪L2 = ∅). Otherwise, when L1 ∩L2 ≠ ∅, we say that players reach an agreement, and the
outcome lottery is the uniform distribution over L1 ∩ L2. Formally, we denote by UN(B)
the uniform distribution over a finite set B, and we define outcome lottery by
f(L1, L2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
UN([n]) if L1 = L2 = ∅,
UN(L1 ∪L2) if L1 ∩L2 = ∅ and L1 ∪L2 ≠ ∅,
UN(L1 ∩L2) if L1 ∩L2 ≠ ∅,
where the first condition is needed only in order that f will be well defined for all pairs of
sets.
For two vectors x, y ∈ [0,1]2 we say that x (strictly) Pareto dominates y, if x1 > y1 and
x2 > y2, and we denote x >> y. We say that an outcome x ∈ [0,1]2 is ε-Pareto efficient (with
respect to A) if there is no a ∈ A such that a >> x + (ε, ε). For ε = 0 we say that x is Pareto
efficient.
The approval voting mechanism might contain inefficient equilibria as demonstrated in
the following example.
Example 1. In the case of 4 alternatives, let the collection of utility profiles be
A = ((1,0), (0,1), (0.9,0.9), (2
3
,
2
3
)).
It is easy to check that the pure action profile (L1, L2) = ({1,4},{2,4}) is a pure Nash
equilibrium with the outcome (23 , 23) which is inefficient.
By considering the above example in more detail, we can see that both players do not lose
by approving also the efficient alternative (0.9,0.9). However, since the opponent disapprove
this alternative neither player gains from approving it either.
In order to resolve this problematic issue, we provide to each player an incentive to
approve this efficient alternative irrespective of whether the opponent approves it or not. We
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consider the mechanism AVδ which is identical to the AV mechanism except in one aspect.
In the case of agreement (L1 ∩ L2 ≠ ∅) the outcome lottery is the uniform distribution over
L1 ∩ L2 with probability 1 − δ (not with probability 1), and the uniform distribution over
L1 ∪L2 with probability δ. Formally,
f(L1, L2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
UN([n]) if L1 = L2 = ∅,
UN(L1 ∪L2) if L1 ∩L2 = ∅ and L1 ∪L2 ≠ ∅,
(1 − δ)UN(L1 ∩L2) + δUN(L1 ∪L2) if L1 ∩L2 ≠ ∅,
Remark 1. Such a “mistake” with probability δ may have several explanations.
• (An obvious explanation.) An intentional “mistake” by the mechanism designer in
order to induce better behaviour.
• (An alternative explanation.) The mechanism performs the standard approval vot-
ing mechanism, but, there in a noise in the communication between the players and
the mechanism. When player i sends a 0/1 message regarding whether he disap-
prove/approve the j’th alternative, with small probability ε the message is flipped
during the communication. If we assume that the noise is independent across alter-
natives and across players, then the resulting lottery is similar to the lottery of AVδ
(when δ = Θ(ε)). The only difference is that in this latter settings with small proba-
bility (of order O(ε2)) the outcome lottery will be the uniform distribution over [n].
Such a difference obviously does not effect the strategic reasoning. Therefore, all the
results that will be developed for the mechanism AVδ will hold also in the scenario
where the implemented mechanism is the approval voting but with communication
noise. Interestingly, we will see that insertion of such a noise to the system results in
a selection of Pareto efficient equilibria only7.
Before we state our main positive result, which is an exact characterization of the pure
Nash equilibria outcomes of the mechanism AVδ, we introduce a fixed-point notion which
(as we will see in the results) is closely related to the mechanism AVδ.
7 The phenomenon that an insertion of a noise to a system may serve as an effective toll for selec-
tion of desirable equilibria is well known. Classical results establish such selections of equilibria in various
settings [29, 9, 33, 27].
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2.1 Average fixed Point
We start with several notations. For a finite collection of vectors B ⊂ [0,1]2 we denote
avg(B) = 1∣B∣ ∑b∈B b, where avg(B) ∈ [0,1]2.
For the collection of utility profiles A and a point x ∈ [0,1]2 we denote by A<,<(x) = {a ∈
A ∶ a1 < x1, a2 < x2} the set of utility profiles in the third quadrant of the axis starting at
x. Similar notation is used for the other quadrants (e.g., A<,>(x) is the second quadrant).
Similarly, we denote A≤,≤(x) = {a ∈ A ∶ a1 ≤ x1, a2 ≤ x2} the third quadrant that includes the
axis.
Definition 1. A vector x = (x1, x2) is a boundaries-included average fixed point of the
collection A if avg(A ∖A<,<(x)) = x.
We call the average fixed point boundaries-included because the utility profiles on the
lower boundary A≤,≤(x) ∖A<,<(x) are included in the computation of the average.
A slightly less restrictive notion of average fixed point, allows a situation where part of
the points on the lower boundary belong to the averaging set and part do not.
Figure 1: An average fixed point.
Definition 2. A vector x = (x1, x2) is an average fixed point of the collection A if there
exists a subset B ⊂ A≤,≤(x) ∖A<,<(x) such that avg((A ∖A≤,≤(x)) ∪B) = x. We denote by
AFP (A) the set of all average fixed points.
Figure 1 demonstrates the definition of an average fixed point.
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The following lemma demonstrates that even the more restrictive notion of boundaries-
included average fixed point always exists, which obviously guarantees the existence of an
average fixed point (i.e., AFP (A) ≠ ∅).
Lemma 1. Every collection A admits at least one boundaries-included average fixed point.
Proof. We set x1 = avg(A), and for t ≥ 2 we set xt = avg(A ∖A<,<(xt−1)).
If A<,<(x1) = ∅ then x1 is a boundaries-included average fixed point. Otherwise, we know
that x2 >> x1 because only strictly-below-average utility profiles were eliminated from the set
A. Similarly, if A<,<(x2)∖A<,<(x1) = ∅ then x2 is a boundaries-included average fixed point.
Otherwise, x3 >> x2 because only strictly-below-average utility profiles were eliminated from
the set A∖A<,<(x1). There are at most n different outcomes, therefore for some t ≤ n+ 1 we
will have A<,<(xt) ∖A<,<(xt−1) = ∅ and xt is a boundaries-included average fixed point.
A natural question arises: Is a boundaries-included average fixed point necessarily unique?
The following example demonstrates that the answer is no.
Example 2. Let A = ((1,1), (0.8,0), (0,0.8)), then both (1,1) and (0.6,0.6) are boundaries-
included average fixed points.
The set of average fixed points is not necessarily a singleton. However, the following
lemma shows that the set of average fixed points has the following structure: it must be a
sequence of (weakly) Pareto dominating outcomes.
Lemma 2. For every two average fixed points x, y ∈ AFP (A), either x ≤≤ y or y ≤≤ x.
Proof. Assume by way of contradiction that x, y satisfies x1 > y1 and x2 < y2. Let Bx ⊆
A≤,≤(x)∖A<,<(x) be such that x = avg((A∖A≤,≤(x))∪Bx). We denote Ax = (A∖A≤,≤(x))∪Bx
and we denoteBCx = (A≤,≤(x)∖A<,<(x))∖Bx the complementary lower boundary points (which
are not included in the averaging). Similarly we denote Ay, By and BCy .
Note that
Ay = (Ax ∪ F ) ∖G (1)
9
Figure 2: The sets Ax,Ay,Bx,By, F and G.
where (see Figure 2)
F = {a ∈ A ∶ y1 ≤ a1 ≤ x1, a2 ≤ x2} ∖BCy and
G = {a ∈ A ∶ a1 ≤ y1, x2 ≤ a2 ≤ y2} ∖By.
With respect to the average x (and specifically the average x2 of player 2), when we
switch from Ax to Ay, we add points that are weakly below x2 (the set F ), and we remove
points that are weakly above x2 (the set G). Therefore, y2 ≤ x2, which is a contradiction.
The existence of an average fixed point (Lemma 1) and the structure of average fixed
points (Lemma 2) allows us to define the notion of minimal average fixed point.
Definition 3. A point mafp(A) ∈ [0,1]2 is a minimal average fixed point if mafp ∈ AFP (A),
and for every y ∈ AFP (A) it holds that y ≥≥mafp.
Note that Lemmas 1 and 2 prove existence and uniqueness of mafp(A).
2.2 Characterization of the pure Nash equilibria
Before the statement of our main positive result, we introduce several notions.
For a collection A, we denote by PE(A) = {a ∈ A ∶ there is no b ∈ A such that b >> a}
the set of Pareto efficient points of A.
Our main positive result is an exact characterization of pure Nash equilibria outcomes of
the mechanism AVδ.
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Theorem 1. For every collection A and for every 0 < δ ≤ 1, the set of pure Nash equilibria
outcomes of the mechanism AVδ is exactly the union of the following two types of outcomes:
1. The set of agreement outcomes
AG(A) = {(1 − δ)a + δx ∶ a ∈ PE(A), x ∈ AFP (A), and a ≥≥ x}.
2. The set of disagreement outcomes
DIS(A) = {x ∈ AFP (A) ∶ There is no a ∈ A such that a >> x}.
The equilibria outcomes are demonstrated in Figure 3. A collection A with a single
disagreement equilibrium, and two agreement equilibria is presented.
Figure 3: Equilibria outcomes of AVδ.
The proof is presented in Section 2.5. A straightforward corollary shows that AVδ is
indeed an anonymous mechanism all of whose equilibrium outcomes are (approximately)
efficient.
Corollary 1. The mechanism AVδ admits a pure Nash equilibrium for every collection A,
and AVδ is an anonymous mechanism which is δ-Pareto efficient in all equilibria.
Proof of Corollary 1. It is easy to check that AVδ is anonymous. It is also easy to check
that all the elements in AG(A) ∪DIS(A) are δ-Pareto efficient. The remaining part is to
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show that AG(A) ∪DIS(A) ≠ ∅. By Lemma 1 AFP (A) ≠ ∅. For some average fixed point
x ∈ AFP (A), if x is not Pareto dominated by any utility profile, then x ∈DIS(A). Otherwise,
there exists an a ∈ PE(A) that Pareto dominates x, and then (1 − δ)a + δx ∈ AG(A).
Theorem 1 can be stated in terms of social choice correspondences and virtual imple-
mentation. For a collection of utility profiles A we define the minimal-AFP Pareto efficient
correspondence (see Definition 3) to be
σ(A) = {a ∈ PE(A ∪AFP (A)) ∶ a ≥≥mafp(A)}.
An immediate Corollary from Theorem 1 is the following.
Corollary 2. The mechanism AVδ virtually implements the social choice correspondence σ.
Actually, in the proof of Theorem 1, we show a stronger result that characterizes the set
of Nash equilibria action-profiles (not only outcomes).
For a collection A, the set of Nash equilibria action profiles of the game ΓAVδ(A) is the
union of the following two types of equilibria:
Agreement equilibria, which exist if there exists a Pareto dominated average fixed
point x ≤≤ a for a ∈ PE(A). The equilibrium action profile is demonstrated in Figure 4.
Figure 4: An agreement equilibrium profile.
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Disagreement equilibium, which exist if there exists a Pareto efficient average fixed
point x. The equilibrium action profile is demonstrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5: A disagreement equilibrium profile.
2.3 Bargaining
As we have seen, the suggested approval voting mechanism is symmetric, it implements only
Pareto efficient outcomes, and in addition the set of outcomes is scale invariant (because
Nash equilibria outcomes are scale invariant). Efficiency, symmetry and scale invariance are
universally accepted axioms in bargaining theory, see [14]. Therefore, it is valid to con-
sider the suggested mechanism in the context of bargaining problems with a finite set of
alternatives (this model has been previously addressed, see [1]). Implementation in the con-
text of bargaining has been mainly studied for sub-game perfect equilibria implementation,
see [3, 16, 10, 1, 18], which establish strong positive results on the implementation of classical
bargaining solutions. Nash implementation, on the other hand, has received less attention
in the literature. One evident reason is that the above mentioned strong positive results are
impossible for Nash implementation, see [18].
The suggested approval voting mechanism has multiple equilibria outcomes and therefore
cannot define a unique point as a solution for the bargaining problem. In fact, there exists no
mechanism with unique equilibrium outcome that satisfies approximate Pareto efficiency, as
we show in Proposition 3 in the Appendix. Nevertheless, the mechanism does produce some
prediction regarding the possible outcomes of the bargaining interaction: no player gets a
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payoff that is less than his utility at the minimal average fixed point. Here we demonstrate
this observation in the classical “partition of the pie” problem (see e.g., Rubinstein [24]).
A similar exercise can be done for general bargaining sets. In the pie partition problem,
there is a unit of good that should be split among the bargainers. There are several ways of
modelling this problem with a finite number of alternatives:
1. The collection is A = ((0,1), (1,0)).
2. The collection is a 1k -grid of the line conv((0,1), (1,0)). Namely, A = (( ck ,1 − ck))kc=0.
There is also a modelling which does not assume efficiency in the definition of the problem.
3. The collection is a 1k -grid of the triangle conv((1,0), (0,1), (0,0)). Namely,
A = {( c
k
,
d
k
) ∶ c, d ∈ N and c
k
+ d
k
≤ 1}. (2)
For both modellings 1 and 2 the unique outcome of both mechanisms AV and AVδ is
the point (12 , 12). This is not very interesting. Actually (12 , 12) is the unique outcome of every
anonymous mechanism M for both modellings 1 and 2. This follows from the fact that the
game induced by an anonymous mechanism, is a symmetric game with constant sum 1, and
therefore has a unique Nash equilibrium outcome (12 , 12).
It is interesting to analyse the outcomes of the mechanism AVδ for small values of δ and k
in modelling (3). The following proposition states that the outcomes get close to the Pareto
efficient segment that connects the points (0.39,0.61) and (0.61,0.39).
Proposition 1. Let A = A(k) be the collection in equation (2). For every k and every δ > 0
all the pure Nash equilibria outcomes of the mechanism AVδ are (δ+ 1k)-close to the segment
conv((x,1−x), (1−x,x)), where x ≈ 0.39 is the solution of the equation x3 −x+ 13 = 0 in the
segment x ∈ [0, 12].
Before the proof of the Proposition, we present a simple observation (given Lemma 2)
regarding average-fixed points that will be useful for finding the average fixed points of A(k).
Lemma 3. Let A be a symmetric collection of utility profiles, and let x = (x1, x2) be an
average fixed point of A, then x1 = x2.
14
Proof. By symmetry of the collection, (x2, x1) is also an average fixed point. By Lemma 2 it
must be the case that (x1, x2) ≤≤ (x2, x1) or the opposite (x2, x1) ≤≤ (x1, x2). In both cases
it follows that x1 = x2.
Figure 6: Equilibria of the splitting-the-pie example.
Proof of Proposition 1. First we approximate the average fixed points of the set A = A(k)
up to an error of 1k . By Lemma 3 all average fixed points of A are of the form (x,x) for
x ∈ [0, 12].
We consider the continuous version where we replace the sets A ∖ A<,<(x,x) and A ∖
A≤,≤(x,x) by the set
B = conv((0,0), (0,1), (1,0)) ∖ conv((0,0), (0, x), (x,0), (x,x))
with the uniform density. The center of mass of B approximates both the average of A ∖
A<,<(x,x) and the average of A∖A≤,≤(x,x) up to an error of 1k because the difference between
these expressions depends only the boundary points that are close to A≤,≤(x,x) ∖A<,<(x,x)
which are at most 1k fraction of all points in A ∖A≤,≤(x,x).
The center of mass of B is given by
1
1
2 − x2 [12(13 , 13) − x2(x2 , x2 )] (3)
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where (13 , 13) is the center of mass of conv((0,0), (0,1), (1,0)), (x2 , x2) is the center of mass of
conv((0,0), (0, x), (x,0), (x,x)), and 12 and x2 are the corresponding areas of these sets. By
the average fixed point assumption we deduce from formula (3) that
1
1
2 − x2 [16 − x
3
2
] = x⇒ x3 − x + 1
3
= 0
This equation has a unique solution for x ∈ [0, 12]. Therefore all average fixed points (y, y) of
A(k) are located 1k close to (x,x). Finally, by the characterization of equilibria outcome in
Theorem 1, we get that all equilibria are agreement equilibria, where the agreement point is(a,1 − a) for y ≤ a ≤ 1 − y and the outcome is δ close to (a,1 − a). See Figure 6.
It is worth explaining why allowing sub-efficient alternatives can create a wider set of
efficient bargaining solutions. The sub-efficient alternatives increase the level of punishment;
i.e., player i can reduce the payoff of player 3−i below 12 (Figure 6). Therefore, new equilibria
arise where player i plays a “clever” punishment strategy in which the opponent’s best option
is to agree on a division where he gets less than 12 . An example of such a “clever” punishment
strategy in Figure 6 for player 1 is the strategy that includes the 22 utility profiles in the
bottom-right trapezoid and one additional utility profile (0.6,0.4). This strategy is “clever”
in the above sense because it balances between two opposite goals of player 1: On the one
hand, to punish player 2 in order to force player 2 to agree to an unfair division; and on
the other hand, to exclude alternatives that are bad for himself, because with a positive
probability δ these bad alternatives are taken into account (even in the case of agreement).
2.4 Pareto frontier
The mechanism is allowed to return lottery outcomes, whereas we measured the efficiency of
a mechanism with respect to the pure utility profiles. Consider, for instance, the following
collection of alternatives:
A = ((1,0), (0.6,0), (0,1), (0,0.6)).
The unique average fixed points of A is (0.4,0.4) which is Pareto efficient (with respect to
A). Therefore, by Theorem 1 (0.4,0.4) is the unique (disagreement) equilibrium outcome. It
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is reasonable to argue that the equilibrium outcome (0.4,0.4) is not Pareto optimal, because
the mechanism can choose a lottery with expected utilities (0.5,0.5).
A stronger (and arguably more suitable in our settings) notion of Pareto optimality is
the Pareto frontier. Given a collection A, an outcome x = (x1, x2) is ε-close to the Pareto
frontier if there is no alternative y ∈ conv(A) such that y >> x + (ε, ε).
We argue that the mechanism AVδ can be modified to a similar mechanism whose out-
comes are arbitrarily close to the Pareto frontier in all equilibria.
A k-uniform distribution over the alternatives [n] is a uniform distribution over a multiset
of size k of alternatives in [n]. We denote by k-UN([n]) the set of all k-uniform distributions
over8 [n].
In the modified mechanism AVkδ , each player submits a set of approved k-uniform distri-
butions over alternatives. Namely, each player i = 1,2 submits a list Li ⊂ k-UN([n]). The
mechanism AVkδ chooses the outcome lottery exactly in the same way as AVδ does. The only
difference, is that here we have a uniform distribution over k-uniform distributions, which
induces a distribution over alternatives.
Proposition 2. The mechanism AVkδ admits a pure Nash equilibrium for every collection
A, and AVkδ is an anonymous mechanism which is (δ + 1k)-close to the Pareto frontier in all
equilibria.
Proof. The mechanism AVkδ over the collection A is identical to the mechanism AVδ over the
collection k-UN(A), where k-UN(A) = {Ei∼µ(ai) ∶ µ is a k-uniform distributoin over [n]} is
the set of expected outcomes under k-uniform distributions over A. By Corollary 1, this
proves existence of pure Nash equilibrium.
For every line conv(a, b) on the Pareto frontier, where a, b ∈ PE(A), the outcomes {mk a+
k−m
k b}km=1 are k-uniform distribution outcomes on the Pareto frontier. Figure 7 demonstrates
that every point that is 1k -far from the Pareto frontier is Pareto dominated by one of such
outcomes mk a+ k−mk b. Therefore δ-Pareto efficiency with respect to k-UN(A) implies (δ + 1k)-
closeness to the Pareto frontier of A. By Corollary 1, all equilibria of the mechanism AVδ
over the collection k-UN(A) are δ-Pareto efficient (with respect to k-UN(A)), which implies
8Note that the number of k-uniform different distributions is finite, and is equal to (n+k−1
k−1 ).
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Figure 7: Points that are Pareto dominated by k-uniform outcomes.
that all equilibria of the mechanism AVkδ over the collection A are (δ + 1k)-close to the Pareto
frontier.
2.5 Proof of Theorem 1
We start with introducing several additional notations. For a set of utility profiles S ⊂ A
we denote by IS = {i ∈ [n] ∶ ai ∈ S} the corresponding set of alternatives. In the opposite
direction, for a set of alternatives L, we denote by AL ⊂ A = {al ∈ A ∶ l ∈ L} the corresponding
set of utility profiles.
For a fixed-point x which includes the boundary point B ⊂ A≤,≤(x)∖A<,<(x) (i.e., avg((A∖
A≤,≤(x))∪B) = x) we partition the boundary points in B into two sets Bi = {a ∈ B ∶ ai = xi},
where B1 ⊍B2 = B.
We start with showing that every outcome x = (x1, x2) ∈ DIS(A) is a disagreement
equilibrium outcome.
We split the utility profiles in A ∖A≤,≤(x) into two groups:
Di = {a ∈ A ∶ ai > xi} for i = 1,2.
The sets Bi and Di are demonstrated in Figure 8.
The fixed point x belongs to DIS(A), therefore, there is no a ∈ A such that a >> x.
So the sets B1 ∪ D1 and B2 ∪ D2 are disjoint. Therefore the payoff profile for the pro-
file (IB1∪D1 , IB2∪D2) is x (because x is a fixed point). We argue that the action profile
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Figure 8: A disagreement equilibrium.
(IB1∪D1 , IB2∪D2) is a Nash equilibrium. Player 1 approves all the above-average alternatives
(D1) and disapprove all the below-average alternatives. Therefore, player 1 cannot increase
his payoff by remaining in a disagreement. Note that all the alternatives in B2 ∪ D2 are
below-average alternatives for player 1. Therefore, every agreement will reduce the payoff of
player 1. Symmetric arguments prove that player 2 has no profitable deviation.
Before we show that every outcome in AG(A) is a disagreement equilibrium outcome,
we introduce a Lemma that will be useful in its proof.
Lemma 4. Let x be an average fixed point and let S2 ⊂ A be a list (of player 2) that approves
all the alternatives in A<,>(x)∪B2 and disapprove all the alternatives in A≤,≤(x)∖B2. Then
max
S1⊂A avg1(S1 ∪ S2) = x1.
Proof. For S1 = {a ∈ A ∶ a1 ≥ x1} we have avg1(S1 ∪ S2) = x1, this is because x is an
average fixed point and every choice of the boundary points {a ∈ A ∶ a1 = x1} does not effect
avg1. This is also the maximal value of avg1(S1 ∪S2) = x1, because every disapprovement of
above-average or approvement of below-average alternative will reduce the average.
Now we show that every outcome (1 − δ)a + δx ∈ AG(A) is an agreement equilibrium
outcome. We denote by R = A≤,≤(a) ∩ A≥,≥(x) the utility profiles in the rectangle that
is formed by the two points a and x. We also denote C1 = A>,≤(x1, a2) ∖ R, and C2 =
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A≤,>(a1, x2) ∖R. Let R = R1 ⊍R2 be an arbitrary partition of the utility profiles in R. The
set Bi,R and Ci are demonstrated in Figure 9.
Figure 9: An agreement equilibrium.
We argue that the action profile (L1, L2) = (IB1∪C1∪R1∪{a}, IB2∪C2∪R2∪{a}) is an agreement
equilibrium. First it is easy to check that L1∩L2 = {a} and L1∪L2 = I(A∖A≤,≤(x))∪B, therefore
the outcome is indeed o = (1−δ)a+δx. Player 1 cannot improve the “disagreement” payoff x1
in o1, because all the above-average alternatives are approved by one of the players (namely,
belongs to L1∪L2), not necessarily by player 1. Moreover, all the below-average alternatives
are disapproved by player 1 (namely not in L1). Now we show that the “agreement” payoff a1
cannot be improved by a unilateral deviation of player 1. Player 1 can break the agreement
(i.e., to disapprove a), by Lemma 4 this will reduce his payoff to x1 or less. Finally, player 1
cannot improve the agreement payoff a1 by switching to another (or adding an additional)
agreement alternative because for all b ∈ L2, b1 ≤ a1. Symmetric arguments prove that player
2 has no profitable deviation.
Now we turn to the second part of the proof where we show that the constructed above
equilibria are all the pure Nash equilibria of the game.
We start with showing that in every agreement equilibrium the agreement outcome is
unique:
Lemma 5. Let (L1, L2) be a pure Nash equilibrium such that L1 ∩ L2 ≠ ∅, then for every
i, j ∈ L1 ∩L2, ai = aj.
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Proof. Assume that L1 ∩ L2 ≠ ∅ and the intersection contains alternatives with different
utility profiles. Without loss of generality, we assume that not all outcomes of player 1 are
identical at the alternatives L1 ∩ L2, and that i ∈ L1 ∩ L2 obtains the minimal utility for
player 1. Player 1 will gain by a disapproval of alternative i (i.e., L′1 = L1 ∖ {i}) because
avg1(AL′1∪L2) = avg1(AL1∪L2) (because the union remains unchanged) and avg1(AL′1∩L2) >
avg1(AL1∩L2).
Now we claim that for every equilibrium the union of the approved sets forms an average
fixed point.
Lemma 6. Let (L1, L2) be a pure Nash equilibrium and let x = avg(AL1∪L2), then x is an
average fixed point; i.e., A ∖A≤,≤(x) ⊂ AL1∪L2 ⊂ A ∖A<,<(x).
Proof. If there exists an alternative l such that l ∉ L1 ∪ L2 and ali > xi then player i has a
profitable deviation to Li ∪ {l}. Therefore, A ∖A≤,≤(x) ⊂ AL1∪L2 .
If there exists an alternative l ∈ L1 ∪L2 such that al << x then we consider two cases.
Case 1: l ∈ Li but l ∉ L3−i. Then player i has a profitable deviation to Li ∖ {l}.
Case 2: l ∈ L1 ∩ L2. Then by Lemma 5 al is the unique agreement outcome. Player 1 has
a profitable deviation to a disagreement by excluding the alternative l (and all the
identical alternatives k such that ak = al) from his approval set.
Therefore AL1∪L2 ⊂ A ∖A<,<(x).
The following lemma shows that the agreement outcome (if exists) is better than the
disagreement outcome, and it is efficient:
Lemma 7. Let (L1, L2) be a pure Nash equilibrium such that L1∩L2 ≠ ∅ and let a ∈ AL1∩L2 ,
then
1. a ≥≥ avg(AL1∪L2).
2. a ∈ PE(A).
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Proof. 1. Assume to the contrary that a1 < avg1(AL1∪L2). By Lemma 5 a is the unique
agreement outcome. Player 1 has a profitable deviation to a disagreement by excluding the
alternative Ia (and all the identical alternatives Ib that are played by player 2) from his set.
A similar argument excludes the possibility of a2 < avg2(AL1∪L2).
2. Assume to the contrary that there exists a′ >> a. By (1) we know that a′ >> a ≥≥
avg(AL1∪L2). By Lemma 6 we get that a′ ∈ AL1∪L2 . Without loss of generality we assume
a′ ∈ L2. Then player 1 can increase his payoff by including a′ into the set of agreements.
The following lemma shows that a disagreement equilibrium has to be efficient:
Lemma 8. Let (L1, L2) be a pure Nash equilibrium such that L1 ∩L2 = ∅, then there is no
a ∈ A such that a >> avg(AL1∪L2).
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists a >> avg(AL1∪L2). By Lemma 6 we get that
a ∈ AL1∪L2 . Without loss of generality we assume a ∈ L2. Then player 1 can increase his
payoff by adding a into his set and turning the disagreement into agreement on a.
Summarizing, every disagreement equilibrium outcome is an average fixed point (Lemma
6) and is not dominated by any utility profile (Lemma 8) which restricts the set of outcomes
to be in DIS(A). In every agreement equilibrium the agreement is on a unique outcome
(Lemma 5) which is Pareto efficient (Lemma 7). In addition, the set L1∪L2 forms an average
fixed point (Lemma 6), and avg(L1 ∪ L2) is Pareto dominated by the agreement outcome
(Lemma 7). This restricts the set of outcomes to be in AG(A).
3 Weighted approval voting mechanisms
The approval voting mechanism chooses an alternative uniformly at random from the inter-
section, or from the union. For the proofs of the results, it is sufficient to assume that the
the distribution by which the mechanism chooses the alternative (from the intersection or
from the union) assign positive probability to each alternative.
For instance we can consider a mechanism where each alternative i has a weight wi > 0. In
case the sets are disjoint (L1∩L2 = ∅), the mechanism chooses the alternative j ∈ L1∪L2 with
probability wj/∑i∈L1∪L2 wi. In case the sets intersect (L1 ∩ L2 ≠ ∅), the mechanism chooses
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the alternative j ∈ L1 ∪ L2 with probability δwj/∑i∈L1∪L2 wi, and it chooses an alternative
j ∈ L1∩L2 with probability (1− δ)wj/∑i∈L1∩L2 wi. We denote this mechanism by AVwδ where
w = (w1, ...,wn).
We argue that all the arguments that hold for AVδ can be translated to arguments onAVwδ . This is because all the arguments rely on the fact that inclusion (exclusion) of below-
average (above-average) numbers into (from) the calculation of the average, reduces the
average. This basic fact remains true also in the case of weighted averages.
More formally, the analogue of an average is the weighted average
avgw(B) = 1∑ai∈B wi ∑ai∈Bwiai
The analogue of average fixed point is the notion of weighted average fixed point.
Definition 4. Given collection A and weights w, a vector x = (x1, x2) is a weighted average
fixed point of the collection A if there exists a subset B ⊂ A≤,≤(x) ∖ A<,<(x) such that
avgw((A ∖ A≤,≤(x)) ∪ B) = x. We denote by AFPw(A) the set of weighted average fixed
points.
Similarly, we can define the notion of minimal weighted average fixed point.
Definition 5. A point mwafp(A) ∈ [0,1]2 is a minimal weighted average fixed point if mwafp ∈
AFPw(A), and for every y ∈ AFPw(A) holds y ≥≥mwafp.
Using similar arguments to those in Section 2.1, we can prove that minimal average fixed
point exists and is unique.
We have an analogous characterization of equilibrium outcomes for the case of weighted
approval voting mechanisms.
Theorem 2. For every collection A, every 0 < δ ≤ 1 and every weight vector w, the set of
pure Nash equilibria outcomes of the mechanism AVwδ is exactly the union of the following
two types of equilibrium outcomes:
1. The set of agreement equilibrium outcomes
AG(A) = {(1 − δ)a + δx ∶ a ∈ PE(A), x ∈ AFPw(A), and a ≥≥ x}.
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2. The set of disagreement equilibrium outcomes
DIS(A) = {x ∈ AFPw(A) ∶ There is no a ∈ A such that a >> x}.
The proof uses exactly the same arguments as the proof of Theorem 1, where the notion
of average is replaced by the notion of weighted average.
Similarly, we can define the weighted minimal-AFP Pareto efficient correspondence to be
σw(A) = {a ∈ PE(A ∪AFPw(A)) ∶ a ≥≥mwafp(A)}.
The analogue of Corollary 2 for weighted approval voting mechanism states the following.
Corollary 3. The mechanism AVwδ virtually implements the social choice correspondence
σw.
This corollary has a similar analogue in the implementation literature. We normalize w
to be a probability vector. We define the social choice correspondence
τw(A) = {x ∈ PE(conv(A)) ∶ x ≥≥ avgw(A)}.
Note that σw and τw are similar. In both cases the correspondence picks all the Pareto
efficient points that Pareto dominate some threshold point. For σw the threshold point is
the minimal weighted average fixed point, for τw the threshold point is simply the weighted
average. Dutta and Sen [7] have proven that (under mild domain restrictions) τw can be
implemented using their canonical mechanism. We prove that a discrete analogue of a
similar SCC which picks as a threshold point the minimal average fixed point rather than the
weighted average, can be implemented using weighted approval voting mechanism. We also
emphasize that weighted average fixed point always Pareto dominates the weighted average
and therefore our mechanism implements a subset of the outcomes that are implemented by
the mechanism of Dutta and Sen [7].
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4 Discussion
4.1 Other solution concepts
4.1.1 Strict Nash equilibria
It remains an interesting open question to analyse the set of mixed Nash equilibria of the
presented approval voting mechanism. Given the fact that this question remains open it
is natural to ask whether the pure Nash equilibria of the mechanism are “more natural”
solutions than mixed ones. Under mild genericity assumptions, we argue that indeed the
pure Nash equilibria are more natural, because they are strict ; i.e., each players loses by
deviation from equilibrium. More concretely, the genericity assumptions are:
1. Players’ utility preferences are strict; i.e., ai ≠ a′i for a ≠ a′.
2. We call an average fixed point x trivial if ∣A ∖ A<,<(x)∣ = 1, namely the average is
done over a single alternative (this alternative must Pareto dominate all the other
alternatives). The second genericity assumption requires that player is never indifferent
between a non-trivial average fixed point and one of his alternatives.
It is easy to see that under these assumptions, the pure Nash equilibria of the mechanismAVδ (see Section 2.2) are strict.
4.1.2 Sequential elimination of dominated strategies
A natural direction that arises is to analyse the approval voting mechanism w.r.t. sequential
elimination of dominated strategies (rather than Nash equilibria). Unfortunately, our char-
acterization of equilibrium strategies (see Section 2.2) indicates that there are cases where
many strategies survive the procedure of sequential elimination (and therefore the sequential
elimination has low predictive power). This simply follows from the fact that every strict
equilibrium strategy (of a single player) survives any sequential elimination. To construct
examples where the set of strict equilibria strategies (of a single player) is large, one might
construct a case with “many” alternatives that Pareto dominate an average fixed point x
and are Pareto dominated by an efficient alternative a (i.e., the set B ∶= {b ∈ A ∶ x << b << a}
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is large), see Figure 4. In such a case every subset of alternatives from B can be “completed”
to a strict equilibrium strategy of player 1 by adding the corresponding list of strategies out
of B (which is the set {b ∈ A ∶ b1 > x1 and b2 < a2} ∖B). Therefore every such “completed”
strategy survives the elimination of dominated strategies. Note that these completed strate-
gies are not necessarily sincere strategies, which are strategies of the form {b ∈ A ∶ b1 > c} for
some constant c. In the following example in all equilibria at least one player does not play
a sincere strategy in equilibrium. This example also demonstrates that existence of a sincere
pure Nash equilibrium—which is guaranteed for the standard approval voting mechanism
(see [22])—is not guaranteed in our modified approval voting.
Example 3. There are six alternatives with utilities
A = ((9,0), (0,9), (8,8), (7,7), (6,0), (0,6)).
The unique average fixed point of A is (5,5). According to our characterization of pure Nash
equilibria, the game admits exactly two pure Nash equilibria:
({1,3,4,5},{2,3,6}) and ({1,3,5},{2,3,4,6}).
Note that {2,3,6} is not sincere strategy of player 2 (because it contain the alternative (0,6)
but not (7,7)), and {1,3,5} is not sincere strategy of player 1.
4.2 More than two players
It is natural to ask whether a similar modification of the approval voting mechanism succeeds
in selecting only Pareto efficient outcomes for the case of more than two players. In the case
of more than two players it is not clear how to define the weights on the alternatives which
got less approvals than the maximum. Here we suggest a natural extension of the two-
player mechanism, but provide a three-player counter-example for this extension. The same
counter-example holds for other extensions as well.
Given an action profile, let k be the maximal number of approvals (among all the al-
ternatives). With probability δ
m∑ki=1 δk the mechanism chooses uniformly at random among
the alternatives that have been approved by at least k −m players (note that indeed the
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alternatives that have been approved by k players are chosen with the highest probability of
1∑ki=1 δk ).
The counter-example consists of eight alternatives
A = ((24,0,0), (0,24,0), (0,0,24), (7,7,0), (7,0,7), (0,7,7), (5,5,5), (6,6,6)).
Consider the action profile ({1,4,5,7},{2,4,6,7},{3,5,6,7}) where every player approves
all the alternatives with non-zero payoff except of the alternative (6,6,6). Note that the
payoffs of the players at this action profile are (5±O(δ),5±O(δ),5±O(δ)) which is Pareto
dominated by the alternative (6,6,6). We introduce here the intuition for the claim that
the presented action profile is a pure Nash equilibrium. The average payoff of player 1 over
the alternatives that achieve at least 1/2/3 approvals is 6.14/4.75/5 correspondingly. By
approving the alternative (6,6,6) player 1 will reduce his average payoff at alternatives that
achieve at least 1 approval, while the other averages (of at least 2 and 3 approvals) remain
unchanged. By disapproving the alternative (5,5,5) player 1 reduces his payoff to 4.75±O(δ)
because after such deviation the maximal number of approvals is 2. It can be checked that
all other deviations (including more complex deviations that simultaneously approve and
disapprove several alternatives) reduce player’s 1 payoff. By symmetry the same holds for
players 2 and 3.
4.3 Ordinal preferences
Throughout the paper we have assumed that players have cardinal von Neumann - Mor-
genstern preferences over the alternatives. In fact, the proof of Theorem 1 uses only the
following properties of player’s i preferences ≻i over the lotteries:
1. UN(B ∪ {a}) ≻i UN(B) for a ≻i UN(B); namely, the player prefers to add an above-
average alternative to the list.
2. UN(B ∖ {a}) ≻i UN(B) for UN(B) ≻i a; namely, the player prefers to erase a below-
average alternative from the list.
These two properties hold for more general settings than von Neumann - Morgenstern prefer-
ences. We can assume that preferences over lotteries are ordinal and monotonic. Monotonic-
27
ity assumes that shifts in probability mass from less preferred to strictly preferred lotteries
over A yield a lottery which is strictly preferred. Note that monotonicity implies proper-
ties (1) and (2). Therefore, the results in the paper can be generalized to the case where
preferences are ordinal and monotonic.
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A Virtual Implementation without Domain Restric-
tions
Abreu and Sen [2] prove their characterization for virtual implementation under mild domain
restrictions. In particular, they assume that a player’s preferences over the alternatives are
strict ; i.e., for i = 1,2 holds ai ≠ a′i for every a ≠ a′. Without the strictness restriction, as is
the setting in our paper, we have the following negative result.
Proposition 3. There is no Pareto efficient social choice function that is virtually Nash
implementable, even for two alternatives.
Proof. We set ε < 12 , and we prove that every mechanism that satisfies existence of ε-Pareto
efficient equilibrium must violate uniqueness of equilibrium outcome.
Informally, the idea is to consider the utility profiles ((0,1), (1,1)) where player 2 is
indifferent between the two alternatives. Player 2 may act as if the utility profiles are((0,0), (1,1)), which in an approximately efficient mechanism should result in a high weight
for the second action. Or, Player 2 may act as if the utility profiles are ((0,1), (1,0)), which
should result in a lower weight to the second action. This leads to two different equilibria
outcomes.
Formally, for the utility profiles A = ((0,0), (1,1)), let (z1, z2) be a Nash equilibrium
with the utility outcome (p, p). Note that p > 12 by ε-Pareto efficiency. In terms of lotteries,
it means that alternative 2 is chosen with probability p > 12 and no player can increase this
probability by a unilateral deviation.
For the utility profiles A′ = ((0,1), (1,0)), let (z′1, z′2) be a Nash equilibrium with the
utility outcome (q,1−q) be the outcome at the equilibrium (z′1, z′2). Without loss of generality
we assume that q ≤ 12 . In terms of lotteries, it means that alternative 2 is chosen with
probability q ≤ 12 and player 1 cannot increase this probability by deviation.
Now consider the utility profiles A′′ = ((0,1), (1,1)). For the action profile (z1, z2),
the utility outcome is (p,1), and player 1 cannot increase the probability of the second
alternative to be chosen; i.e., player 1 has no profitable deviation. Obviously, player 2 has no
profitable deviation either. For the action profile (z′1, z′2), the outcome is (q,1), and player
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1 cannot increase the probability of the second alternative to be chosen. Therefore we have
two different equilibria outcomes (p,1) and (q,1).
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